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Articles
THE NEW MATH OF SENTENCE CALCULATION AFTER
FIELDS, WICKES, AND HENDERSON

by David C. Wright, Stephen Z. Meehan, and Joseph B. Tetrault
I. INTRODUCTION

For a long time the General Assembly has
implemented and relied upon the award of diminution
credits to prisoners! serving sentences in the State's
prisons.2 The function of diminution credits is two-fold:
First, to encourage prisoners to maintain good conduct
and accept employment at prison jobs. Second, it function
to alleviate overcrowding by promoting early release of
nonviolent and non-felony drug offenders. Over the last
decade the General Assembly has expanded the authority
and discretion of the Parole Commission to impose
penalties upon the revocation of mandatory supervision
release. 3 Further complicating matters, over the same
period, the diminution credit scheme itselfhas undergone
several amendments and modifications.4
The changes in the law governing the diminution credit
scheme resulted in a more complicated sentence calculation
for the 5, 000 prisoners per year that enter the Maryland
state prisons, especially for those prisoners with
consecutive, partially consecutive, or overlapping
sentences. 5 The changes also impacted the sentences of
prisoners already in the State prison system whose tenns
ofconfinement were retrospectively effected by legislation
or court decisions.

1 Individuals housed in the State of Maryland Division of Correction
("DOC") prefer to be referred to as "prisoners," implying they are
detained against their will, as opposed to "inmates," which they believe
implies some consent to or acquiescence in their confinement.

2

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700 (Supp. 1998).

3

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (1997).

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700 (Since 1970 this section has been
amended over thirteen times); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511 (1997)

4

(Since its inception this section has been amended at least six times);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (Since its inception this section has been
amended over five times).
5

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(d}(2)-(3}.

The executive branch's concern over liability
compounded by the perceived leniency for the incorrect
early release ofprisoners further complicated the sentence
calculation. The Division of Correction ("DOC") cured
the inconsistencies by imposing overly strict interpretations
of sentence calculation statutes. In some instances the
DOC even engaged in outright unauthorized bookkeeping
methods.
The result was a legal war between prisoners and
the State waged in and refereed by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland. The first battle of that war was waged on
behalfofWayne Hood, Michael Sayko, and Merrill Fields,
three prisoners who challenged the DOC's unauthorized
disallowance of street time credits awarded by the
Maryland Parole Commission and the denial of certain
good conduct credits. 6 On writ of certiorari, the court of
appeals held that the DOC had misapplied the respective
statutes. Consolidated under Maryland House of
Corrections v. Fields,? the decision resulted in the en
mass release of prisoners who had been imprisoned
beyond their correct release dates. Fields, Sayko, and
Hood were followed into the fray by Wayne Wickes, who
challenged the DOC's application ofthe 1992 amendments
creating a two-tiered good conduct credit system. 8
Reported as Beshears v. Wickes,9 the decision adopted
a short-lived interpretation of Article 27, Section 700 of
the Maryland Annotated Code which created multiple
tenns ofconfinement for calculation purposes. Pursuant
to that decision, the DOC en mass arrested approximately
50 prisoners who had been released on mandatory
supervision, not for violating the tenns ofthat release, but
because the State had recalculated and retrospectively

6 See Maryland House of Corrections v. Fields, 113 Md. App. 136,
686 A.2d 1103 (1996), affd, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d 167 (1997).

7Id.
8

See Beshears v. Wickes, 349 Md. 1,706 A.2d 608 (1998).

9Id.

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 25
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revised their release dates. One of those arrested was
Vincent Henderson, who was released on a petition for
writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City. \0 The State sought certiorari and the court ofappeals,
in Secretary, Dep 't ofPub. Safety & Correctional Servo
v. Henderson revised the interpretation of Article 27,
section 700 adopted in Wickes. II The court further held
that the retroactive recalculation and re-incarceration of
prisoners on mandatory supervision release was
improper. 12

II. RELEVANT CHANGES IN THE LAW PRIOR
TO THE 1992 LEGISLATION
Diminution credits for state prisoners in Maryland
have existed for decades. 13 However, prisoners released
by the accumulation of credits, as opposed to those
released by parole, were not under supervision until 1970. 14
Even if a prisoner released on mandatory supervision
release committed a new offense, that prisoner's
mandatory supervision release could not be revoked. In
1970 the General Assembly amended the statute to
provide, "[a]ny person sentenced after July 1, 1970, shall,
upon release, be deemed as if released on parole. "15 The
amendment further provided the released person was to
"remain under the supervision ofthe State Department of
Parole and Probation until the expiration ofthe maximum
term or terms for which he was sentenced. "16
See Secretary, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servo
Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998).
10

11

ld.

12

See id. at 452-53,718 A.2d at 1157-58.

The statute was amended again in 1989, to permit
the Parole Commissioner presiding at a revocation hearing
to, "rescind all diminution credits previously earned on the
sentence or any portion thereof." I 7 Prisoners sentenced
after 1970 but before 1989 challenged the retrospective
application ofthe amendment on ex postfacto grounds. IS
In Frost V. State, the court rejected the argument, ruling
that ''the only logical interpretation ofthe previous statute
that would accomplish its purpose required a loss of
diminution credits by operation of law."19 The 1989
amendment also provided that a person who violated
mandatory supervision release ("MSR") may not eam any
new credits on the balance ofthe sentence imposed for
violating MSR 20

A. The 1992 Changes
By 1992, the General Assembly increased the total
possible credit under Article 27, section 700 to 20 days
per month. 21 The same amendment allowed certain
prisoners to receive ten good conduct credits per month if
they had not been convicted of crimes of violence as
defined in Article 27, section 643B or drug felony
offenses. 22 An uncodified section of the amendment
provided for prospective application only to a term of
confinement imposed after October 1, 1992.23 It is the

17

1989 Md. Laws, ch. 307.

18

See Frost V. State, 336 Md. 125,647 A.2d 106 (1994).

V.

13 Dimunition credits are earned by the inmates to reduce the length of
their confinement. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 700 specifies four types of
dimunition credits: Inmates can earn dimunition credits based upon good
conduct, "satisfactory performance of work tasks," "satisfactory progress
in vocational or other educational or training courses," and "satisfactory
progress in specially selected work projects or other programs." ld. at §
700( d)-(f) & (h). This paper focuses on good conduct credits, unlike the
other credits good conduct credits are deducted "in advance from the
inmate's term of confinement, subject to the inmate's future good
conduct." ld. at § 700(d)(1).

191d. at 138, 647 A.2d at 113.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612(f); Prisoners and the DOC are
currently litigating whether this prohibition is directed towards the
remainder of any mandatory supervision term or extends as well to a
new sentence. The DOC takes the view that one must "max out" on the
old sentence before any credits can be applied to the maximum expiration
date of the new sentence. The prisoners' point of view is that under
Article 27, section 700, diminution of confinement credits accrue on the
new sentence from the date of commitment to custody of the
Commissioner of Correction. Under the Wickes regime the prisoners
were successful but after Henderson the DOC returned to its prior
position in this regard. There are as of yet no reported appellate decisions
on these "max to max" cases.

20

21

See 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 588

151d.

22

As defined in MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286 (Supp. 1998)

161d.

23

See 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 588, § 2.

14

See 1970 Md. Laws, ch. 406

29.2 U. BaIt L.F. 26
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latter amendment that spawned the Fields, Wickes, and

Henderson cases. 24

B. The Cases
1. Fields
The Fields case entailed a consolidated appeal of
three separate habeas petitions, each seeking immediate
release based upon diminution credits. 25 The court
considered the following three issues in Maryland House
ofCorrection v. Fields:

entitled to double good conduct credits on the qualifying
sentence?28
3) Street time. Upon the Parole Commission
revoking mandatory supervision release and awarding both
street time and diminution credits, in calculating the
prisoner's resulting obligation to the State, may the DOC
deduct the street time from the diminution credits and only
apply the remaining diminution credits?29
a. Administrative Exhaustion

26

1) Administrative Exhaustion. In contesting a
sentence calculation, was an inmate required to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to filing a petition for writ of
habeas COrpUS?27
2) Double good conduct credits. Is an inmate
who is serving both a qualifying and disqualifying sentence

24 The 1992 changes also caused the DOC to ponder whether certain
offenses were indeed crimes of violence. In particular, in late 1996 the
DOC decided that manslaughter by automobile was a crime of violence
and halved the credits of prisoners convicted of that offense. Some of
the prisoners were actually awaiting release when the Commissioner of
Correction, Richard A. Lanham, Sr., in consultation with the Secretary
of Public Safety, Stuart Simms, and Governor Parris Glendening, made
the decision to retroactively apply Wickes, causing the arrest of those
previously released and the retention of those awaiting release. Not
surprisingly prisoners sought habeas corpus relief. See Sacchet v. Blan,
120 Md. App. 154,706 A.2d 620 (1998).

See Maryland House of Corrections v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 703 A.2d
167 (1997). While Fields, Sayko, and Hood were consolidated for
argument before the Court and opinion by the Court, only Fields raised
all three issues. Sayko raised only the first two issues and Hood raised
only the third issue. Accordingly, the joint opinion is generally referred
to as Fields.

The DOC has established a lengthy and somewhat
complicated administrative hearing process to redress
prisoner grievances. 30 This process follows five steps:
1) Mandatory informal resolution,
2) Administrative Remedy Procedure to the warden
("ARP"),

3) Appeal ofAdministrative Remedy Procedure to
the Commissioner of Correction ("AARP"),
4) Inmate Grievance Office ("I GO") complaint
before an administrative law judge of the Office of
Administrative Hearings, and

25

See id. In Hood. Sayko and Wickes. the prisoner plaintiffs were
represented by the Prisoner Rights Information System of Maryland,
Inc. (PRISM). In Fields and Henderson. PRISM attorneys filed amicus
curiae briefs arguing in the interest of the similarly affected prison
population. In both Fields and Henderson. the amicus curiae position
carried the day. PRISM is a private legal services corporation designated
by the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services to provide legal services to prisoners in the DOC in certain very
limited areas. In addition to assistance with federal civil rights claims
resulting from conditions of housing, excessive force, improper medical
care, and other similar matters, PRISM's representation extends to state
habeas corpus proceedings based upon improper or illegal sentence
calculations.
26

27

See id. at 249,703 A.2d at 169.

2K

See id.

29

See id.

Despite the requirements of Annotated Code of Maryland, Article 41,
Section 4- J04(h)(2) (1993 & Supp. 1995), the DOC's administrative
remedy procedure has never been adopted pursuant to the procedures
specified for the adoption of regulations in the Administrative Procedure
Act, Md. Code Ann., State Government Article, § 10-1 0 I (1995). Instead,
it is contained in 28 separate Division of Correction Directives ("DCDs")
which total 66 pages and have 14 appendices. DCDs 185-00 I through
185-700 (effective April I, 1993). This requirement was not adopted
until 1983, after the decision in State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111,297 A.2d
265 (1972). Moreover, the early versions of the administrative remedy
procedure were much simpler than the present one. In 1985 it consisted
ofa mere five pages. Division of Correction Regulation ("DCR") 185-2
(effective August 5, 1985). Even as late as 1992 the procedure was only
ten pages long. DCR 185-2 (effective June I, 1987). It was not until
1993 that it became the huge, unwieldy procedure discussed in the text.

JIl

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 27
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5) Mandatory review of any favorable decision by
the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional
Services.3)

COMAR 12.07.01.03D requires that the prisoner first exhaust the
"administrative remedy procedure," before filing a complaint with the
IGO. This requires that a prisoner must:
I. File a request for informal resolution of his/her complaint to
the staff member involved, pursuant to DCD 185-203.
2. Prison officials have 15 days from the date that they receive
the request to respond, pursuant to DCD 185-101, §III.A.1.
3. After receiving the response to the requested informal resolution,
the prisoner must file a request for Administrative Remedy (ARP) to
the warden, pursuant to DCD 185-402.
4. The institution has five working days from the date it receives
the request to "index" the request, pursuant to DCD 185-101, §III.C.3.
5. The warden then has 30 days from the date the request is
indexed to respond and may request an additional 10 days, pursuant to
DCD 185-101, §III.F.
6. After receiving the warden's response, the prisoner must file
an appeal to the Commissioner of Correction (AARP), pursuant to
DCD 185-403.
7. The Commissioner's office has five working days from the
date it receives the appeal to index the appeal, pursuant to DCD 185101, §III.H.3.
8. The Commissioner has 20 days from the date an appeal is
indexed to respond, pursuant to DCD 185-101, § III.K.
Once the prisoner receives a response from the Commissioner the
prisoner is free from the procedural labyrinth which is a prerequisite to
filing a complaint with the IGO, and he may then finally file such a
complaint. The IGO procedure, however, is not without its obstacles
and delays, as it does not provide for an immediate hearing as does the
habeas corpus procedure, and it does not provide prisoners with the
ancillary litigation tools, which are consistent with procedural due process.
The complaint to the IGO is processed as follows:
I. The IGO has 60 days to perform an initial review to determine
if the case should be dismissed without a hearing, pursuant to Art. 41,
§4-1 02.1 (d)( 1997}.
2. If the complaint is not dismissed, it is referred to the Office of
the Administrative Hearings.
3. A prisoner is not allowed to use prehearing discovery. COMAR
12.07.01.08B.
4. The prisoner is only permitted to call "such witnesses as the
[Inmate Grievance] Office or an administrative law judge agrees may
have relevant testimony to submit and as may be available at reasonable
times." COMAR 12.07.01.08C(2).
5. Although hearings are supposed to be held and decisions issued
"promptly," there are not actual limits in which a hearing must be held or
a decision issued.
6. If the administrative law judge who conducts the hearing finds
the complaint to be meritorious in whole or in part, the decision must be
sent to the Secretary ofthe Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services.
7. The Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services has 15 days to review the decision. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 4-102.1.

31

29.2 U. BaIt L.F. 28

The administrative decision is appealed on the record to
the circuit COurt. 32 The total time to complete this process
may easily exceed six months. 33
In Fields, the DOC contended that the prisoner must
first exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas
corpus relief. 34 Therefore, the DOC argued that the
principles of administrative law required exhaustion of
administrative remedies and judicial review prior to seeking
habeas corpus relief. 35 The DOC argued that Fields was
barred because ofhis alleged procedural missteps.36
Fields had pursued his administrative remedies
through the IGO.37 Believing he was long overdue for
release, he sought to avoid the delay ofthe judicial review
process and seek habeas corpus relief. 38 The DOC
maintained that Fields was barred from seeking habeas
corpus relief prior to exhausting the judicial review step,
even though section 4-102.1 (k) did not address habeas
corpus proceedings either expressly or implicitly.39
Additionally, the DOC argued that since Fields had raised
only the award of double good conduct credits in his
administrative remedies, and had not raised the street time
issue administratively, he was barred from raising the street
time issue by way of a habeas corpus proceeding.40

32

See MD. RULE 7-201, et seq.

Assuming that the prisoners met all ofthe applicable deadlines, it may
take 85 days for the prisoner's complaint to reach the IGO. Once the
prisoner's complaint reaches the IGO, assuming the matter is scheduled
before an administrative law judge within 30 days as required, it may
take an additional 105 days for the prisoner to receive a final decision
from the IGO.
It should also be noted that after the circuitous detours of the
administrative process leading to the IGO, and after the IGO process,
the prisoner's complaint is returned to the Secretary of the Department
against which the prisoner has filed his complaint. The Secretary then
has what is effectively veto power over a decision of an administrative
law judge that may be in the prisoner's favor.

33

34

See Fields, 348 Md. at 256, 703 A.2d at 173.

3S

See id.

36

See id.

37

See id. at 252, 703 A.2d at 171.

38

See id.

39

See id. at 259-60, 703 A.2d at 174.

41l

See id. at 256, 703 A.2d at 173.
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The prisoner plaintiffs, in the cases before the court
in Fields, asserted that the resolution in their favor of the
. unauthorized taking of street time credits and the failure to
award statutorily mandated good conduct credits claims
entitle them to immediate release. Therefore a habeas
corpus petition was proper.41 The prisoners relied upon
Earle v. Gunnell42 which held that prior to the prisoner
fIling a 42 U.S.C. § 1983, civil rights action in state court,
exhaustion of the remedy provided by the IGO is not
requiredY The Earle prisoners relied on former Md.
Rule Z41,44 which provided that any unlawfully confined
prisoner may file for habeas corpus relief 45
The Fields prisoners also put forth Frost v. State46
and Gluckstern v. Sutton 47 to support their position. In
Frost, the appellant had reached the court by way of a
habeas corpus proceeding fIled as a challenge to the legality
ofhis confinement without first exhausting administrative
remedies. 48 In Gluckstern, the court affirmed the grant
of habeas corpus relief in the case of a prisoner who
challenged the retroactive application of statutory
requirements for parole from the Patuxent Institution
without first exhausting administrative remedies.49 In both
cases the court never addressed the exhaustion question,
but rather proceeded to the substantive issues. While no
Maryland cases have opined on this specific issue, foreign

41

See id.

42

78 Md. App. 648, 554 A.2d 1256 (1989).

43

See id. at 658,554 A.2d at 1261.

The "z" rules were repealed prior to the Fields decision and are now
found at Md. Rule 15-301, et seq.

44

4l

See Earle, 78 Md. App. at 656, 554 A.2d at 1260.

46

336 Md. 125,647 A.2d 106 (1994).

46

319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898, cert. denied sub nom. Henneberry v.
Sutton, 498 U.S. 950 (1990).

courts which have addressed the question have ruled that
administrative exhaustion is not a prerequisite to habeas
corpus relief.50
Finally, the Fields prisoners argued that the DOC's
administrative remedy process was insufficient, if not
illusory. The DOC's administrative system is slow,
cumbersome, and often leaves prisoners no further relief
than when they started. The practical reality is that even
when a prisoner reaches the IGO, the prisoner can expect
a six month delay before a hearing, that is ifthe lGO does
not dismiss the complaint on procedural grounds thus
requiring judicial review on the dismissal prior to any
productive review. A system so bogged down is simply
inadequate to address challenges to the duration of
confinement when the inmate, if successful, is entitled to
immediate or near immediate release. The power of the
Secretary ofthe Department ofPublic Safety to have final
review and veto power makes the process illusory.
The court determined that, "the usual legal
presumption is that the administrative remedy is primary
and must be '''first invoked and followed" before resort
to the courts. "'51 The court also concluded that, generally,
prisoners withafOl grievance or complaint against afOl office
were required to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking relief under other common law or statutory
remedies. 52 However, in the case ofprisoners entitled to
immediate release challenging illegal confinement, there
was no logical bar to habeas corpus proceedings in the
administrative scheme. 53 Writing for the Fields Court,
Judge Chasanowopined:
lO The purpose of habeas corpus is to allow a restrained person "to have
a speedy investigation into the cause of his detention and to secure his
release that takes at least six months unless he is lawfully detained."
Such a purpose is frustrated if an administrative procedure is a prerequisite
to habeas corpus relief. Luckie v. State, 502 So.2d 870, 872 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1986). The court must balance the interests of judicial economy
and administrative efficiency, against the right of the individual to gain
his freedom at the earliest possible time through a writ of habeas corpus.
If the court finds the balance tipped in favor of the prisoner, a habeas
corpus petition will be considered without first exhausting the
administrative remedies. Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314, 316
(M.D. Pa. 1974).

Fields, 348 Md. at 258-59, 703 A.2d at 174 (quoting Md. Reclamation
v. Harford Cty. 342 Md. 476, 493, 677 A.2d 567, 576 (1996».

SI

48

See Frost, 336 Md. at 130-31,647 A.2d 108-09.

S2

See id. at 259-60, 703 A.2d at 175.

49

See G1uckstem, 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898.

S3

See id. at 260,703 A.2d at 174-75.
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If a habeas corpus proceeding, by an
inmate asserting an entitlement to immediate
release, were nothing more than a commonlaw or statutory remedy, we would agree with
the Division that the inmate would be required
first to invoke and exhaust the administrative
procedure.
A habeas corpus proceeding, however,
is not simply a common-law or statutory remedy
over which the General Assembly has full
controL Instead, it is a remedy authorized and
protected by the Constitution of Maryland.
MD. CONST. Art. III, §55 provides that "[t]1)e
General Assembly shall pass no Law
suspending the privilege ofthe Writ of Habeas
Corpus." While the legislature may
"reasonably" regulate the issuance ofthe writ,
any legislatively imposed regulations must not
impair the fundamental right to the substantive
remedy of habeas corpus. 54
b. Double Good Conduct Credits for Post-October
1, 1992 Offenders.

The determination of this issue hinges on the
interpretation and application of''term ofconfinement" as
that term is used in the 1992 amendment to Article 27,
section 700,55 which implemented a dual system of good
conduct credits for qualifying and disqualifying sentences.56

Those prisoners serving qualified sentences imposed after
1992 receive double good conduct credits of 10 days per
month, while prisoners serving disqualifying sentences
received only 5 days per month. 57 All offenders sentenced
prior to 1992 received credit at the old rate. Due to the
1992 amendment to Article 27, section 700, the legislature
created the possibility that a prisoner could owe an
obligation to the State consisting oftwo separate sentences,
one ofwhich was for a qualifying offense for which sentence
was imposed after 1992, and one of which was for a
disqualifying offense, or a pre-1992 sentence. 58
The DOC contended that "term of confinement"
included the entire obligation to the State and that if any
portion of that obligation was for a disqualifying offense
.or a pre-1992 sentence, the prisoner was disqualified from
receiving double good conduct credits on the entire
obligation to the State. 59 The prisoners took the position
that a period of incarceration consisting of multiple
sentences imposed at different times cannot be considered
to have been imposed at any single definite point in time
and is therefore not a single term of confinement, at least
on the good conduct issue. 60 In point of fact, the prisoners
contended that with the potential for additional sentences,
a term ofconfinement can never be said to have been fully
imposed until it has been fully served. 61
(2) For an inmate whose term of confinement includes
a consecutive or concurrent sentence for either a crime of
violence as defined in Article 27, §643B of the Code or a
crime of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or
possessing a controlled dangerous substance as provided
under Article 27, §286 ofthe Code, this deduction shall be
calculated at the rate of 5 days for each calendar month,
and on a prorated basis for any portion of a calendar month,
from the first day of commitment to the custody of the
Commissioner through the last day of the inmate's
maximum term of confinement.
(3) For all other inmates, this deduction shall be
calculated at the rate of 10 days for each calendar month,
and on a prorated basis for any portion of a calendar month,
from the first day of commitment to the custody of the
Commissioner through the last day of the inmate's
maximum term of confinement.

54Id. at 260;703 A.2d at 174-75 (citing OIewilerv. Brady, 185 Md. 341,
346,44 A.2d 807, 809 (1945); State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880)).
55

MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(a).
In this section, "term of confinement" means:
(I) The length of the sentence for a single sentence; or
(2) The period from the first day of the sentence beginning
first through the last day ofthe sentence ending last for:
(i) Concurrent sentences;
(ii) Partially concurrent sentences;
(iii) Consecutive sentences; or
(iv) A combination of concurrent and consecutive sentences.

See Fields, 348 Md. at 263,708 A.2d at 176. Specifically the operative
language of Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(d) stated:
(I) An inmate shall be allowed a deduction in advance from
the inmate's term of confinement, subject to the inmate's
future good conduct.

57

See 1997 Md. Laws, ch. 588.

58

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(a).

59

See Fields, 348 Md. at 263, 703 A.2d at 176.

6()

See id. at 265-66, 703 A.2d at 177.

61

See id. at 266-67, 703 A.2d at 178.

56

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 30

Articles
The court ruled that while the definition of "term of
confinement" as set forth in Article 27, section 700,
included a prisoner's total obligation to the State, the clarity
of that definition does not '''preclud[e] [the court] from
looking at the purpose of the statute. '''62 The court noted
that the legislative history behind the implementation of
double good conduct credits was to reduce prison
overcrowding. 63 Based upon the legislative history, the
court concluded that a prisoner's obligation to the State
could be comprised ofmore than one term of confinement
with the application of good conduct credits for qualifying
nonviolent sentences and disqualifying or pre-1992
sentences as the statute provided. 64 The court explained
that
[t]he effect of this decision is that, for those
sentences imposed before October 1, 1992,
good conduct credits should be awarded at the
old rate of five days per month. Those
nonviolent, non-drug related sentences imposed
during a new sentencing after October I, 1992
should carry good conduct credits at the rate
often per month. 65

credits used to secure mandatory release. 68 At this point,
the parole commissioner has the discretion to reduce the
time remaining on the sentence by crediting all or part of
the days spent out on supervision69 and allow the prisoner
to retain all, some, or none of the diminution credits the
prisoner had earned and used to secure mandatory
supervision release. 70
Notwithstanding the statutory provision, the DOC
took the position that street time credit and diminution
credits could not both be applied to the balance of the
sentence to be served. 71 The DOC's ultimate concern
was that in a case where a prisoner was awarded all of
the street time and all ofthe diminution credits, the Parole
Commission could effectively terminate any return to
custody and return the prisoner to the street. 72 The DOC
argued that the institutional commitment offices were
required to deduct the street time credit awarded by a
parole commissioner from the good conduct credits
awarded by the Parole Commissioner and the net result
was applied against the balance of the time the prisoner
had to serve. 73 The DOC argued that it was not exercising
any discretionary authority, but was merely carrying out
the Parole Commission's decision and cited its own internal

c. Street Time

When a prisoner's time in custody and the prisoner's
total diminution credits equals the total sentence and the
prisoner has not previously been released on parole, the
prisoner is released to mandatory supervision for a period
equal to his diminution credits. 66 Upon violation, the
prisoner appears before a parole commissioner for a
revocation hearing.67 Where the parole commissioner finds
that the prisoner has violated the mandatory supervision
release, the prisoner is required to serve the balance of
the sentence - time equal to the number of diminution

Fields, 348 Md. at 263,703 A.2d at 176 (qouting State v. Thompson,
332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993».

62

68

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511(c).

MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511 provides in part: "[I]fthe order of
parole is revoked, the prisoner shall serve the remainder ofthe sentence
originally imposed unless the Commission member hearing the parole
revocation, in the member's discretion, grants credit for time between
release on parole and revocation of parole."

69

70 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (1988) provides in part: "The Parole
Commissioner presiding may rescind all diminution credits previously
earned on the sentence or any portion thereof in the revocation
proceedings. "
68

See Fields, 348 Md. at 269, 703 A.2d at 179.

63

See id.

64

See id. at 267-68, 703 A.2d at 178.

6\

ld. at 268, 703 A.2d at 178.

66

See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612 (1997).

The DOC maintained this position despite the fact that the controlling
legislation did not prohibit such a result. Logically, however, such a
result would be unlikely in that if the Commissioner sought to achieve
such an end result, the means would very likely have been simply a
decision not to violate MSR.

67

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511 (a) (1997).

7J

12

See Fields, 348 Md. at 268-69, 703 A.2d at 179.
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regulations, the Commitment Procedures Manual, as
authority for its position. 74 To this day, those regulations
have never met the scrutiny of the legislature and are not
reliable authority. 7S
The prisoners set forth a three-prong attack on the
DOC's form of cipher. 76 First, the Parole Commission
was perfectly within its authority to grant sufficient street
time and good conduct credits to effectively vacate the
balance of the sentence. 77 Second, it is the Parole
Commission and not the DOC which has the sole authority
to rescind good conduct credits following revocation at
mandatory supervision. 78 Third, if street time and good
conduct credits are both designed to reduce a prisoner's
sentence, it is illogical and illegal to deduct one from the
other for sole purpose of making a prisoner serve more
time. 79
The respective DOC's and prisoners' approaches
may be demonstrated as follows:

Prisoners' Approach

DOC's Approach

Detennining Initial Maximum Expiration Date ("MED''):
Imposition:
1/1190
Tenn:
7yrs.
Current MED: 111197

Imposition:
111190
Tenn:
7yrs.
CurrentMED: 111197

MSRdate:
Returned:

9/22/94
6/25/96

MSRdate:
Returned:

9/22/94
6/25/96

Days Out:
Street Time:

641
<641>
-0-

Days Out:
Street Time:

641
<641>
-0-

Adj.MED:

111197

Adj.MED:

111197

New
Imposition:
Tenn:
NewMED:

12/31196
5yrs.
12/31101

New
Imposition:
Tenn:
NewMED:

12/31196
5 yrs.
12/31101

Determining New Mandatory Supervision Release
("MSR") Date:
Old GCC:
MPCResc:
GCCBal:

831
<401>
431

Old GCC:
MPC Street:
subtotal:

831
<641>
190

. MPCResc.:

<401>

Illusory subtotal: -0-

New GCC:
GCCBal:
74

See id. at 269, 703 A.2d at 179.

Under the DOC's approach, upon retake if a prisoner was awarded a
larger amount of street time than good conduct credits, it is possible to
be returned to prison with more of an obligation to the State for the same
sentence than when the prisoner was released on mandatory supervision.

75

76

See Amicus curiae brief for PRISM, Fields (No. 125-1996).

77

See Fields, 348 Md. at 271,706 A.2d at 180.

78

See id.

79

See id. at 269-70, 706 A.2d 179.
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300
731

MSR Date: 12/31/01
less 731 days =12/30/99

New GCC.:
GCCBal:

300
300

MSR Date: 12/31/99
less 300 days = 3/6/01

After setting forth this dual sentence calculation in
their amicus curiae brief in Fields,80 the prisoners
demonstrate the illogic ofthe DOC's stance. The confusion
ofthe "illusory subtotal," implies the DOC has an unwritten
8(1

See id.
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rule "which magnanimously requires that the prisoner not
be given a negative diminution credit balance which would
require the prisoner to serve time to offset that negative
balance before he may actually begin serving his
sentence."81 The brief asserts there is a severe flaw in an
accounting system which must include in its procedure a
built in adjustment to avoid results which are logically
dictated to be incorrect. 82 The brief concl udes that the
mere fact that such an illogical result must be avoided by
an exception to the stated procedure is evidence that the
procedure itself is defective. 83
The amicus brief further illustrates the effect of the
DOC's dubious procedure. 84 The Parole Commission
gives "street time" which is accounted for in the adjusted
maximum expiration date. 85 The DOC then takes away
that "street time" by deducting it from the prisoners
diminution credits. It is unclear, as the brief states, the
source from which the DOC derives its authority to
subtract the "street time" credit from the diminution
credits. 86
The brief notes the Parole Commission derives its
authority from two separate statutes enacted by the
Maryland General Assembly.87 Moreover, the brief
asserts, the logical intent of those statutes support Parole
Commission's position. 88 The DOC's basis of support is
its own Commitment Procedures Manual which was
adopted without any prior public dissemination or
opportunity for public comment and is subject only to the
delegable approval authority of the Commissioner of
Correction. 89 Further illustrating the illogic ofthe system,

the computer system used is acknowledged by the DOC,
''to be incapable of correctly calculating sentences. ''90
The court agreed with the prisoners' position. The
DOC's interpretation of street time credits was found to
be "especially illogical" in light ofthe statute.91 Article 41,
section 4-511(d)(I), provides that upon revocation of
mandatory supervision release, the prisoner shall serve the
remainder ofthe sentence originally imposed, unless the
Maryland Parole Commission, in its discretion, grants credit
for the time between release on mandatory supervision
and revocation of that mandatory supervision. 92 The
language of subsection (d)(I) provides that the prisoner
must serve the balance ofthe originally imposed sentence,
unless the Parole Commission grants street time credit. 93
The court concluded that the DOC was without
authority to adjust the award of diminution credits given
by the Parole Commission. 94 That authority rests solely
within the discretion of the Parole Commission. 95
Accordingly, the court concluded that the DOC
improperly adjusted prisoner's diminution credits by the
amount of street time credit awarded the prisoners by the
Parole Commission. 96
2. Wickes
Beshears v. Wickes 97 was the first test case of the
DOC's interpretation of Fields. Fields raised the more
general question about the appropriate application ofthe
October 1, 1992 amendment to post-amendment violators
with nonviolent offenses. Wayne Wickes challenged the
Id. (quoting Petitioner's (Division's) Brief at n.6, Fields (No. 1251996).

90

91

See Fields, 348 Md. at 269, 706 A.2d at 179.

92

MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-511.

81

Amicus curiae brieffor PRISM at 30, Fields (No. 125-1996).

82

See id.

83

See id.

84

See id.

8S

See id.

See id. (Subsection (d)(2) creates an exception to that exception which
prohibits the Parole Commission from granting street time credit to
those prisoners whose mandatory supervision was revoked as a result
of violent crime. The Court of Appeals implied that exception to the
exception substantiated the statutory authority for use of the exception.)

86

See id.

94

See Fields, 348 Md. at 271,706 A.2d at 180.

87

See id.

9S

See id.

88

See id.

%

See id. at 271-72,706 A.2d at 180.

89

See id.

97

349 Md. 1, 706 A.2d 608 (1998).

93
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DOC's application ofthe good conduct credit amendment
to a prisoner who was serving sentences for both a preamendment violent crime and a post-amendment
nonviolent crime.98 Confronted with that factual scenario,
the DOC concluded that the pre-amendment sentence for
a violent crime tainted the post-amendment sentence for a
nonviolent crime for the purposes ofawarding double good
conduct. 99 Wickes argued that such an interpretation was
an incorrect reading of both the statute and the Fields
decision. 100
On a petition for habeas corpus, the trial court agreed
with Wickes and ordered that the DOC apply good
conduct credits at the rate of 10 per month to the sentence
for the post-amendment nonviolent crime. 101 The DOC
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
but the Court ofAppeals of Maryland, sua sponte, issued
a writ of certiorari to decide the question. 102 The court
affirmed the trial COurt,103 but included dicta that resulted
in the creation of multiple terms of confinement for each
individual sentencing event where there was a break in
custody from the DOC.
Applying the Fields decision to Wickes' case, Judge
Chasanow, writing for the court, concluded that "the
sentencing of a defendant for a subsequent offense while
he is out on mandatory supervision release for a prior
offense is a separate sentencing event:'I04 As such, the
court stated that "Wickes's sentences for the violent
offense ofrape and the nonviolent offense ofthird-degree
burglary [were] part of two separate sentencing events
and, therefore, are to be deemed separate terms of
confinement."IOS

98

See Wickes, 349 Md. at 5, 706 A.2d at 610.

99

See id. at 4, 706 A.2d at 609.

100

See id. at 5,706 A.2d at 610.

101

See id.

102

See id.

103

See id. at 3, 706 A.2d 609.

104

Id. at 11, 706 A.2d at 613.

IO~

Id. at 12, 706 A.2d 613.
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As innocuous and possessed of a priori logic as that
statement may seem, the DOC relied upon this dicta in
Wickes as a basis to recalculate sentences for those
prisoners who were serving or had served partial
concurrent, partial consecutive, qualifying and disqualifying
sentences. 106 The result was that numerous prisoners were
"Wickes'ed."107 This meant the DOC applied Wickes
106 The operative language, defined by the prisoners as dicta, was not so
defined by the DOC or the minority of the Court in Henderson, 351
Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150 (1998). That language was as follows: "Finally,
we reiterate our rejection ofthe Division's argument, posited in Fields,
that to calculate separate rates for separate terms of confinement being
served consecutively 'would be difficult to administer.'" Wickes, 349
Md. at 10,706 A.2d at 612 (quoting Fields, 348 Md. at 265, 703 A.2d
at 177). However, an illustration shows that the calculations are not that
complicated.
An inmate may have two different mandatory release dates
just as the inmate may serve concurrent sentences of
different lengths. For example, an inmate is serving
concurrent overlapping sentences A and B. Sentence A is
a ten-year sentence for a crime of violence imposed on
January 1, 2000. The inmate is released on mandatory
supervision 600 days early (10 years x 5 credits/month x
12 months/year =600 good conduct credits. While out on
mandatory supervision release the inmate receives sentence
B, a ten-year sentence for a nonviolent, non-drug related
offense imposed on January 1, 2009, which would terminate
on January 1, 2019 without the application of any good
conduct credits. Because this subsequent offense violates
the conditions of the inmate's mandatory release, his
mandatory supervision release is revoked and he must now
serve the 600 days remaining on sentence A, which he also
began serving on January 1, 2009. Thus, the inmate's
mandatory release date with respect to sentence A will be
August of20 1O. Unless the inmate's B sentence is reversed,
however, the inmate will not actually be released in August
of20 10 because with regard to sentence B, the inmate will
not be eligible for mandatory supervision release until
September of 2015 (more than 3 years early through the
application of good conduct credits at a rate of ten days
per month - 10 years x 10 credits/month x 12 months/year
= 1200 good-conduct credits). In other words, even though
these sentences overlap, the inmate will have two different
mandatory release dates. Similarly, if sentence B were for
one year, the mandatory supervision release date would be
August of 20 10, instead of September of2009. Moreover,
as we said in Fields, "[w]e should not adopt the Division's
theory merely because to do otherwise would saddle the
Division with more complex calculations." Id. at 10-11,
206 A.2d at 603 (quoting Fields, 348 Md. at 265, 703 A.2d
at 177).

107 At argument before the court of appeals in Henderson, upon
questioning from the court, counsel for the Secretary indicated very few
prisoners were effected, less than 100 prisoners. When asked by the
court, counsel for the prisoners reported that the DOC's house counsel
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retrospectively to prisoners' sentence calculation and thus
moved mandatory release dates further into the future or
issued administrative escape retake warrants to return
prisoners who, on recalculation, were released too
early. lOS

sentence calculation system which provided for cell parole
for partially concurrent, partially consecutive "overlapping"
sentences. An "overlapping consecutive/concurrent"
obligation to the DOC may be graphically illustrated as
follows:

a. History behind Wickes

To understand the nuances of the DOC's
interpretation of the dicta in Wickes, one must participate
in a history lesson in sentence calculation and return to the
line graphs of our adolescence. 109 Prior to 1990 and the
codification ofDCIB 9-90 by amendment to the provisions
of Article 27, section 700,110 the DOC operated under a

advised that 2000 prisoners were effected. Counsel for the Secretary
was forced to acknowledge the accuracy of the prisoners' head count.
108 See generally Wickes, 349 Md. I, 706 A.2d 608. The Wickes decision
did not reach the issue of street time credit for the time the DOC said
these prisoners were wrongfully released. However, logic certainly
supports the contention that an erroneous release on mandatory
supervision subject to the same terms and conditions as if one were on
parole, is in effect a parole, or, at the very least, that such a prisoner is
entitled to street time credit for that period during which he was on
mandatory supervision release without violation of its condition.

109 Much of this history and the illustrative graphs are directly from the
prisoners' brief in Henderson.
110 DCIB No. 9-90, dated March 9, 1990, SUBJECT: A WARDING
DIMINUTION OF CONFINEMENT CREDIT FOR INMATES
WITH OVERLAPPING CONCURRENT SENTENCES
I. Secretary Bishop L. Robinson has now received advice
by memorandum from Attorney General J. Joseph Curran
on the application of diminution credits to overlapping
concurrent sentences. Overlapping concurrent sentences
are those which:
a. have a starting date which falls between the inmate's
then current starting and maximum expiration dates; and
b. cause a new maximum expiration date which falls
beyond the current maximum expiration date.
2. Attorney General Curran's memorandum advises that
credits earned under Article 27, section 700 between the
first day of commitment and the maximum expiration date
are to be applied to the maximum expiration date. Section
704A credits, it follows, are to be applied in the same
manner. This means that credits ordinarily will not be
attributed only to specific sentences, but instead to whole
terms of incarceration. Specific circumstances may require
exceptions to this, and they will be reviewed and dealt
with as they arise.

3. A hypothetical case will illustrate the principles set out·
in this policy:
If inmate Jones has a three year sentence beginning
January I, 1990, and receives a second three year sentence
beginning on January I, 1991, his maximum expiration date
will be January I, 1994. Good conduct days attributable
to the four year term (assuming full good conduct credits,
240 days) will be applied to this maximum expiration date.
Additionally, all industrial, educational, and special project
credits earned from January 1, 1990 will be applied to this
maximum expiration date.
4. This method of applying diminution credits will be
implemented immediately by all commitment offices, and
will be applied to all new transactions occurring after the
date ofthis DCIB. Additionally, the DOC will, as soon as
reasonably possible, recalculate all sentences of this nature
which have not been calculated in accordance with the above
method. The review of existing sentences will be under the
supervision of the commitment supervisor for each
institution, who shaH:
a. ensure that first the sentences of all inmates scheduled
for release on mandatory supervision (those in the "short
file") are reviewed and recalculated under the policy set
out in this DCIB, if necessary;
b. ensure that the sentences of all inmates identified on
a computer list generated from OBSCIS and provided by
DOC HQ are reviewed and recalculated under this DCIB,
if necessary;
c. ensure that specific claims of overlapping concurrent
sentences by or on behalf of inmates are reviewed to assure
that the sentences are calculated consistent with this DCIB;
and
d. ensure that the sentences of all inmates returned to
custody from escape, parole, mandatory supervision, or
other out-of-custody status are reviewed, and to the extent
necessary, recalculated under this DCIB.
5. In the event there are any questions about this procedure,
or concerns about possible exceptions to the procedure,
they should be referred to Warren Sparrow, Chief of
Classification.
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1_ _ _ _ _ __
Start Date
Sentence B III

Period of Cell Parole

- -_ _ _ _ _-1 _________ 1

Expiration Date
Sentence B

Start Date
SentenceB
Expiration Date
Sentence A

Start Date
Sentence A

Often, such an "overlapping consecutive/concurrent"
sentence is caused by a break in custody due to a release
on parole or mandatory supervision from an original
sentence, followed by a new sentence and subsequent
revocation of parole or mandatory supervision on the
original sentence. Such an "overlapping consecutive/
concurrent" sentence may be graphically illustrated as
follows:
Period of ParolelMandatory
Supervision Release
SentenceB

1-----------------1
_ _ _ _I

Start Date Parole
Sentence B Mand. Sup
Release Date

Start Date
Sentence A

1_ _ _ _ __

Start Date
Expiration
Retake of Date Sent. B
Sent. B

Expiration Date
Sentence A

Prior to 1990, the DOC applied diminution of
confinement credits to individual sentences so that a
prisoner with an "overlapping consecutive/concurrent"
sentence would be "released" to "cell parole" on sentence
B, but would remain to complete service of sentence A.
That may be graphically illustrated as follows:

III For the purpose of consistency, if not logic, in sentence illustrations
and hypotheticals, the author has used the DOC's sentence identification
style of identifying the first sentence as Sentence "B" for "Before" and
the second sentence as Sentence "A" for "After." (The author is unable
to attribute the praise for this bit of nomenclature to any individual in
the DOC, so the DOC as a whole is the recipient of such praise.)
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Mand. Sup. Release Date
SentenceB

Cell Parole

1---------

Start Date Maximum Expiration Date
Sentence A
Sentence A
In response to prisoner litigation, the DOC
reevaluated its practices in regard to "overlapping
consecutive/concurrent" sentences and "cell parole" and
on March 6, 1990, issued Division of Correction
Information Bulletin ("DCIB") 9-90, which directed the
DOC's commitment clerks to apply diminution of
confinement credits to the maximum expiration date farthest
in the future. DCIB 9-90 abolished the practice of "cell
parole" and inmates received the benefit of all diminution
ofconfinement credits awarded or earned while in prison.
Subsequent to the abolishment of "cell parole," inmates
no longer lost the benefit of diminution credits earned on
the earlier sentence and received earlier mandatory
supervision release dates and earlier releases from
incarceration. However, the DOC still maintained the view
that a combination of sentences for eligible and ineligible
offenses in an "overlapping consecutive/concurrent"
sentence structure rendered the prisoner completely
ineligible for special project diminution credits for the entire
period of incarceration.
Pursuant to Article 41, section 4-612(f), the DOC
determined that a prisoner could not earn any diminution
of confinement credits on a subsequent "overlapping
consecutive/concurrent" sentence until the prisoner reached
the maximum expiration date ofthe prior revocation of
mandatory release sentence. 112 These cases became
known as "max to max" cases, as good conduct credit on
the subsequent sentence was only awarded from the
maximum expiration date of the prior sentence to the
maximum expiration date ofthe subsequent sentence, rather

112 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-612(0 provides: "A person under
mandatory supervision may not earn any new diminution credits once
the mandatory supervision has been revoked."
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than from the date of commitment on the subsequent
sentence to the maximum expimtion date ofthat subsequent
sentence. This may be illustrated as follows:
Period of ParolelMand.
Supervision

1

Maximum Expimtion
Date

1______ -' _ _1

Post 7/1189 Sentence B
Sent B
Sentence B ParolelMand. Retake
Start Date Release Date Date

1
1

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1

111180
Start Date
Sentence B

111185
Maximum Expiration Date
Sentence B

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1

111181
Start Date
Sentence A

111186
Maximum Expiration Date
Sentence A

1
1
1

Start Date
Sentence A

Start Date Release Date
for earning
Sentence A
diminution
credits

Consider the following example. 113 On January 1,
1980, John Doe is committed to the custody of the
Commissioner of Correction for a sentence of five years.
F or the sake of simplicity, let us eliminate pretrial credit
under Article 27, section 638C, and posit that the sentence
also commences on January 1, 1980. The maximum
expiration date is therefore January 1, 1985. OnJanuary
1, 1981, Doe is again committed to the custody of the
Commissioner of Correction for a sentence of five years,
commencing January 1, 1981. The new maximum
expimtion date is now January 1, 1986. The total obligation
to the DOC is six years. The sentence structure may be
graphically illustrated as follows:

113 The following assumptions apply to this hypothetical: (1) all four
convictions are for the same offense; (2) there are no forfeitures for
violating prison disciplinary rules (See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700(g));
(3) neither prisoner makes parole; (4) each prisoner gets 120 diminution
of confinement credits per year of incarceration (60 good conduct credit
and 60 industrial credits with the good conduct credits given in a "lump
sum" at entry into the DOC and the industrial credits being earned on a
month by month basis at a rate of five days per month of incarceration).

On January 1, 1980, Mike Roe is committed to the
custody ofthe Commissioner of Correction for a sentence
offiveyears,commencingJanuary 1, 1980. OnJanuary
1, 1981, Roe is sentenced to one year, to be served
consecutively. Roe's maximum expimtion date is January
1, 1986. Roe's total obligation is six years. The sentence
structure may be graphically illustrated as follows:

1_----1-1_ _ _~I
111180
111/85
111/86
Start Date End Date Sent. B
Maximum Expiration
Date
Sentence B Start Date Sent. A
Both Sentences
Based upon the preceding hypothetical, prior to
March 6, 1990, the official effective date ofDCIB 9-90,
Doe's and Roe's sentences could have been calculated as
follows:
(1) Roe would have been released to mandatory
supervision on or about April 22, 1984, having received
the benefit of360 good conduct credits and approximately
259 industrial credits;
(2) Doe would have been "released" to "cell parole"
on his "B" sentence on or about August 4, 1983, having
been awarded 300 good conduct credits on that sentence
and having earned approximately 216 industrial credits;
(3) Doe would have remained incarcerated to
complete the service of the "A" sentence and would not
have actually been released from incarceration until on or
about December 15, 1984. At this point he has been
awarded 300 good conduct credits on his second sentence
but has only received the benefit of 82 industrial credits
earned between the date ofhis "cell parole" and his actual
mandatory supervision release date.
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Let us assume that prior to April 22, 1984, under
the hypothetical set forth above, Doe and Roe shared the
same cell and worked side-by-side in the same prison
kitchen for their five industrial credits per month. On April
22, 1984, Doe sees his cell mate, who was convicted of
the same offenses and received the same time to serve, go
home, while Doe stays in prison for another eight months.
As a result of that inequity, prisoners in Doe's situation
filed suit and sought relief. In response to these cases, the
DOC promulgated DCIB 9-90, which officially became
effective on March 6, 1990. For the first time, DOC
commitment staffwere directed to apply diminution credits
against the entire term of confinement. At the request of
the Department ofPublic Safety and Correctional Services,
the General Assembly subsequently amended Article 27,
section 700, to add a definition of "term of confinement"
that comported with the application of credits called for
by DCIB 9-90. 114
The legislative history of the 1991 amendmentto
Article 27, section 700 shows that the DOC's current view
of sentences is that of separate terms of confmement for
the purpose ofapplying the benefit ofdiminution credits. I 15
This view is contrary to the intent ofthe General Assembly
and is violative ofthe guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. The amendment originated as House Bill 174.116
The Department ofPublic Safety and Correctional Services
filed a bill entitled "Position on Proposed Legislation. "117
That document reads that the amendment in question,
concerning the definition of "term of confinement,"118
would:

[mlake it clear, consistent with Division [of
Correction] practice and view of current law
[i.e., the view contained in DCIB 9-90], that
diminution of confinement credits are applied
across the entire term of confinement an inmate
is serving, as opposed to being applied to the
individual sentences that make up thattenn. The
result is that an inmate with a combination
of consecutive and concurrent sentences is
awarded good conduct credits in the same
manner as an inmate who must serve the
same amount of time, but based upon a
single sentence. This is consistent with the
manner in which the Maryland Parole
Commission, under law, treats the sentences
to which an inmate is subject when parole is
granted. 119
In the wake of Wickes, the DOC returned to "cell
parole" for those prisoners with sentences separated by a
break in custody as a result ofreincarceration after release
to either mandatory supervision or parole. 120 It should be
noted that the amendment to Article 27, section 700, was
as a result of the DOC's request to codify DCIB 9-90,
and that the DOC was interpreting that amendment to
Article 27, section 700, in such a way as to recreate the
equal protection problem DCIB 9-90 was designed to
cure. The equal protection problems presented by the
DOC's approach may be illustrated by another
hypothetical.

119

114

See 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 354.

liS

See id.

116

See id.

117

See id.

118 Prior to July I, 1991, the effective date of the amendment, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §700, provided for deductions, " ... within the period between
the first day of commitment to the custody of the Commissioner and the
last day of the inmate's maximum term of confinement," but did not
define, "term of confinement." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700 (1987
Repl. Vol.).

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 38

1991 Md. Laws,ch. 354 (emphasis added). A review of the H.B. 174
file reveals that the particular amendment to the definition of term of
confinement was approved with little or no controversy. It appears that
another amendment that took effect in 1991 and prohibited the award of
diminution of confinement credits to prisoners serving Maryland
sentences in foreign jurisdictions occupied more committee attention
and comment from both the Legal Aid Bureau and the Office of the
Attorney General.
12U Wnile the breaks in custody in both Fields and Wickes were caused by
mandatory supervision releases, there appears to be no logical distinction
between parole and release to mandatory supervision under these
circumstances. It is unknown in its post-Wickes calculations how the
DOC would treat a break in confinement due to an escape.
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On January 1, 1990, John Doe is sentenced to ten
years in the DOC, commencing on January 1, 1990, with
a maximum expiration date of January 1,2000. Doe is
granted parole effective on January 1, 1995. Doe remains
free from DOC custody for two years. On January 1,
1997, Doe receives a sentence often years, commencing
January 1, 1997, running concurrent with the prior sentence
and resulting in an adjusted maximum expiration date of
January 1, 2007 for Sentence A. Parole is revoked. He
owes the DOC two years for time out of custody. Doe is
allowed one year credit for "street" time. 121 He owes the
DOC one year, which is added to the end of his first
sentence, but which does not affect his maximum expiration
date to give him an adjusted maximum expiration date of
January 1,2001 for Sentence B. Doe'sobligationmay
be graphically illustrated as follows:
Period of Release
on Parole

1
1/1/90
Start Date
SentenceB

1________ -'
1/1/95
Parole Date
SentenceB

Start Date
SentenceB
Retake

1
1/1/97
Start Date
Sentence A

1/1/2001
Maximum
Expiration
Date
Sentence B

1
1/1/2007
Maximum
Expiration
Date
Sentence A

On January 1, 1990, Jane Roe is sentenced to ten
years in the DOC, to commence on January 1, 1990, with
a maximum expiration date of January 1, 2000. Roe is
granted parole effective on January 1, 1995, and is free
from DOC custody for two years. Parole is revoked on
December 1, 1997, and Roe is allowed one year "street"
time. Roe owes the DOC one year which is added to the

121

See MD. ANN CODE art. 41, § 4-511(d)(1).

end of that sentence to give Roe an adjusted maximum
expirationdateofJanuary 1,2001. On January 1, 1997,
Roe is sentenced to six years in the DOC, to be served
consecutively to the parole violator sentence. 122 Roe's
obligation is graphically illustrated as follows:
Period of Release
on Parole

1-1_____ 1
1/1/90
Start
Date
Sent B

1/1/95
Parole
Date
SentB

1/1/97
Parole
Retake
Original
Date

1
1/1/01
Adjusted
Maximun
Expiration
Date
Sentence B

1
1/1/07
Maximum
Expiration
Date
Sentence B

The total obligation to the DOC in both cases is
exactly the same. However, in the post-Wickes world of
diminution of confinement credits, at least in the DOC's
view of that world, Roe receives the benefit of all credits
awarded or earned during the entire period of
incarceration, while Doe will have to "mandatory out" on
the balance of Sentence B and then start allover again on
the Sentence A.123 Again, assuming credit at a rate of
120 days per year (60 days per year for good conduct
credit awarded in a lump sum at the start of each
incarceration and five days a month industrial credits
earned and applied on a month to month basis) and no
forfeitures of good conduct credit for violating prison
disciplinary rules, Doe will be released to mandatory
supervision on or about May 14,2004, while Roe will be
released to mandatory supervision on or about September
24, 2002, a difference of roughly 20 months.
122 Under the DOC's interpretation of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 690C
(1996), parole must first be revoked for a sentence to be run consecutively
to a term imposed for a parole violation. If, as in most cases, parole is
not revoked until after a new sentence is imposed, and even though the
sentencing judge may have specified that the sentence was to be served
consecutively to the parole violation sentence, the DOC treats the new
sentence as starting on the date of its imposition and thus is either an
"underlapping" sentence or an "overlapping concurrent/consecutive"
sentence.
123 1996 Md. Laws, ch. 567, added a prohibition to MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 700(k) which prevents a parole violator from receiving the benefit
of credits earned prior to release on parole. This provision could not be
applied to either prisoner without violation of ex post facto principles.
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h. Getting" Wickes' ed"
Representatives from the DOC testified before the
Maryland General Assembly that the cell parole theory of
sentence calculation was too cumbersome and unfair in its
application. Moreover, the DOC also testified that it was
incapable ofrecalculating all those sentences in regard to
the double good conduct credits. However, the DOC's
reaction to Wickes was to recalculate all ofthe prisoners
sentences. For those individuals who had been released
based upon a overlapping consecutive/concurrent
sentence calculation but which would not have been
released at that time under a cell parole sentence
calculation, the DOC issued administrative escape
warrants 124 for approximately 160 prisoners. 125

3. Henderson
Vincent Henderson was released from the DOC to
MSRonJuly7, 1997. 126 On May 5, 1998, after 10 months
ofinfraction :free mandatory supervision release, Henderson
was "Wickes' ed" under the authority of an administrative
retake warrant charging escape. 127 After retaining
Henderson in custody for several days, Henderson was
released on May 14, 1998 pursuant to habeas corpus
relief granted by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on
the grounds that the DOC had violated Henderson's due
process rights. 128 Some short time after Henderson was
released, the DOC released those other prisoners which
had been "Wickes'ed" back into custody, but still
maintained that the DOC had acted properly in retaking

124 These were not judicially issued arrest warrants, but rather
administrative escape retake warrants issued by the Parole Commission.

12.1 Administrative escape retake warrants were issued for III individuals,
and an additional 13 warrants were issued for individuals who had been
erroneously released but also had parole violations pending.
126

See Henderson, 351 Md. 43S, 447, 71S A.2d. 1150, 1155 (199S).

127 See id. at 447-4S, 71S A.2d. at 1155. Approximately 50 individuals
were physically returned to the DOC pursuant to an administrative
escape retake warrant.
128

See id. at 449, 71S A.2d at 1156.
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the prisoners. 129 On May 18, 1998, the DOC appealed
the decision to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
and at the same time petitioned the Court of Appeals of
Maryland for issuance of a writ of certiorari. 130 The court
granted the petition and the matter proceeded on an
expedited basis with arguments held only three weeks later
on June 6, 1998.131
The case was of obvious importance to Henderson,
but the system-wide impact was more significant. The
DOC was forced to finally admit that their twist on the
Wickes decision impacted some 2000 prisoners and thus
resolving the difficulties created for that large prisoner
population was imperative.132
On appeal, the DOC took the position that its postWickes policies were a correction of its prior erroneous
construction of Article 27, section 700, which had been
corrected by Wickes. 133 The DOC further argued that
Henderson's due process rights were not violated because

129 See id. at 450, 71S at 1156. At oral argument before the court of
appeals on Henderson, the court was prompted to ask the DOC, if the
court of appeals ruled in their favor, would the DOC retake all effected
prisoners, hold themjust long enough for them to lose their employment,
housing, and means of transportation, and then release them.
130

See id.

131 Henderson argued for affirmation of the trial court on ex post facto
principles of state and federal constitutional grounds and his counsel,
Ralph S. Tyler, formerly Deputy Attorney General of Maryland and
now a partner in the Baltimore office of Hogan & Hartson, LLC,
vehemently objected to PRISM's entry into the case as amicus curiae
on behalf ofthe general prison population. Tyler was concerned that the
general prison population's arguments could adversely affect or detract
from his argument on behalf of his one client.
PRISM took the position that the problem, while systematic,
was not constitutional in nature. PRISM recognized the sweeping effect
the DOC's interpretation had on the prison population and the systemic
interests in resolving the issue for the entire prison popUlation to avoid
delay and overcrowding ofthe court docket. The court of appeals agreed
and permitted PRISM to brief and argue as amicus curiae on behalf of
the prisoners on several grounds, including the need to amend Wickes.
In rendering its decision in Wickes, the court of appeals
understandably did not appreciate how the dicta in that case would be
used by the DOC to make mischief. The court ultimately adopted the
prison«rs' position and revised the Wickes decision rather than reaching
any constitutional issues, thus resoiving not only Henderson's problem,
but the dilemma that faced all similarly situated prisoners.
132

See supra note lOS.

133

See Henderson, 351 Md. at 451, 71S A.2d. at 1156.
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the DOC's policy pursuant to Wickes was a foreseeable
result and he was not required to serve any more time
than required under the law. 134
Henderson argued that the Wickes decision
constituted a new ruled the DOC's retroactive application
of Wickes was arbitrary and capricious. I35 Henderson also
raised two constitutional arguments. First, that the
retroactive application of Wickes violated the federal and
state constitutional prohibition against ex postfacto laws,
and, second, that it violated substantive due process. 136
As amicus curiae, PRISM argued for the prisoner
class that the DOC's interpretation of Wickes violated
federal and state equal protection principles and the clear
intent of the statute. 137 Accordingly, the court needed to
clarify its decision in Wickes to ensure that prisoners
received the full benefit oftheir earned diminution credits. 138
Finally, Wickes should be applied retroactively to the
prisoners benefited by the decision. 139
Judge Wilner authored the Henderson decision for a
divided court.140 That decision held that Judge
Chasanow's decision in Wickes went beyond what was
necessary to render a decision in that case and it was that
additional language, argued by the prisoners to be diCta,141
that had caused the mischief that prompted the Fields
litigation
While there was no true mea culpa, the court of
appeals did acknowledge the misstep of Wickes and
heeded the amicus curiae IS call to clarify Wickes, bringing
an end, for now, to the long running credits controversy.

134

See id. at 447-49,718 A.2d at 1I55.

m See id. at 448,718 A.2d at 1155.
136

See id.

137

See Amicus curiae brief for PRISM at 9, Henderson (No. 39-1998).

138

See id. at 20.

139

See id. at 24.

140 The opinion was written by Wilner, J., andjoined by Eldridge, Raker
and Cathell, JJ. Chasanow, J., author of Frost, Fields and Wickes, filed
a heated dissent and was joined by Bell, C.J., and Rodowsky, 1.
141 During oral argument there was a respectful but spirited debate
between prisoners' counsel and Judge Chasanow as to whether or not
that language was in fact dicta. Judge Chasanow maintained at oral
argument and later in his dissent that the language did indeed set forth the
law of the case.

In so doing, the court concluded that the rule of lenity
alone would have dictated the same result in Wickes and
Fields without any need to go further. 142 Additionally,
had the ruling been confined to those instances where strict
application of the section 700 definition of "term of
confinement" deprived some inmates ofthe benefit ofthe
1992 law, there would have been no confusion. 143 But,
no. The court entered a ruling that envinicated a broader
definition of "term of confinement" which does not
aggregate sentences imposed before and after mandatory
supervision release. The court held that "[t]he sole basis
of the Division's recalculation of Henderson's good
conduct credits was the language we used in Wickes ...
That and that alone, is what led the Division to redetermine
the mandatory supervision release dates of some 2,000
inmates."142
The majority recognized that the expanded holding
of Wickes resulting in a restricted application of Article
27, section 700, "was not necessary in order to reach the
result in Wickes. "143 The court clarified the rule regarding
aggregation, stating, "[a]pplication ofthe statutory direction
to aggregated the sentences produces no ambiguity in this
instance; it does not deprive Mr. Henderson or others
similarly situated ofany legislatively created benefit."I44
Most significant in the majority opinion was the court's
recognition ofthe nuances inherent in Maryland' s diminution
of confinement scheme. Concluding the court's opinion,
Judge Wilner opined:
These three cases -- Fields, Wickes, and
Henderson -- illustrate the different ways in
which a statute such as Ch. 588 can affect
inmates in our correctional system. In Fields
and Wickes, we were dealing with one context
and did not need, or really intend, to go beyond
it. In articulating a secondary justification for
our holding in Wickes, we inadvertently led the
Division to a conclusion that was both
unintended and erroneous. Fields and Wickes
remain good law, based on the ambiguity
created in the circumstances ofthose cases and
142

See Henderson, 351 Md. at 451-52,7.18 A.2d at 1157.

143

See id. at 452,718 A.2d at 1157.

144

[d. at 451,718 A.2d at 1157.
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its resolution through application of the rule of
lenity. That rule does not require a departure
from the statutory direction in § 700 when, as
here, there is no ambiguity .145
In Fields and Wickes, the court adopted unanimous
positions. When it came to Henderson and the
interpretation of Wickes, the court divided 4-3. The
stinging tone of the minority decision illustrates just how
seriously divided the court was on this question.
The majority's opinion is consistent with
Fields and Wickes in its explanation of the
history of § 700 and the interpretation of that
statute as applied in Fields and Wickes. The
majority strains to manufacture a way to make
the Fields and Wickes decisions inapplicable
to recidivists who commit violent crimes on
parole in order to let those violent recidivists
out earlier than our express language in the
Wickes decision would allow. I do not believe
this inconsistent construction that benefits
violent multiple offenders was the intent ofthe
legislature, and I know it is contrary to the
express language of Wickes and was neither
the intent ofthe author ofthe Fields and Wickes
opinions nor at least two additional members
of the Court. 146
III. CONCLUSION
Prisoners' litigation is not a pursuit which carries
public favor, especially in regard to matters concerning
early release from incarceration. It is popular to say that,
"If a person is sentenced to five years, he should serve
five years." But that is not really the issue in the series of
cases which have been discussed in this article. Even the
most ardent proponent of incarceration would not agree
that, "If a person is sentenced to five years, he should
serve seven years."

145

[d.

146 [d. at 452,718 A.2d at 1157, (The reader should also note, that while
not explicitly stating the same, the Henderson Court found the language
which was at issue in Wickes to indeed be dicta.)
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The Rule ofLenity is a long standing general principle
oflaw by which any discretion in imposition or calculation
of sentence is resolved in favor ofthe prisoner. For some
reason, the DOC moved away from that rule a few years
ago, and began the policies which have resulted in the
litigation which is the subject of this article. 147 The
prisoners have described the DOC's conduct in this regard
as the Rule of Dislenity, whereby any discrepancy in
sentence calculation is resolved to the prisoners' detriment.
So far the Rule of Lenity has prevailed,148 although in the
guise ofesoteric and arcane statutory interpretation. Most
assuredly there will be legislation which addresses the effect
of this series of decisions. That legislation will most
probably be aimed at closing a loophole and eliminating
any discrepancy which might invoke the Rule of Lenity.
The reader may judge for themselves what course the
DOC and the prisoners will pursue at that time. 149
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[d. at 453, 718 A.2d at 1158.
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[d. at 455-56,718 A.2d at 1159 (Chasanow, J. dissenting).

149 This move occurred roughly contemporaneously with the revelation
that John Thanos may have been released prior to his correctly calculated
release date. The reader will note that Thanos was executed for murders
which occurred after his actual release, but prior to what could be argued
to be his correctly calculated release date.
150 Additionally, while Fields, Sayko, Hood, and Wickes were victories
for the prisoner, Henderson may fairly be called only a retrospective
victory.
151 Currently pending before the Court of Appeals is Lomax v. Warden,
No. 45, Sept. Term 1998, in which prisoners are challenging the
Governor's policy of no parole for parolable life sentences.

